Abstract-The growth of the Internet has created tremendous the negotiations, of actually exchanging the resources, etc.). opportunities for online collaborations. These often involve col-Although there are so many situations where collaboration laborative optimizations where the two parties are, for example, is mutually advantageous, it often does not occur and its jointly minimizing costs without violating their own particular .
tional power, storage capacity, inventory, production capacity, In the above equations, the first constraint ensures that the electronic components, etc, and the relevance of exploiting benefits Alice gains from this re-allocation is the same as the such "win-win" situations in an online environment becomes benefits Bob gains. The second constraint ensures that the total apparent. The advent of the Internet and of grid computing valuations for Alice is equal to the total valuations for Bob.
[12], [13] makes this trading easier and more beneficial by The third constraint ensures that the total fractions Alice owns decreasing the "friction" in the system (costs of carrying out in pre-allocation is same as in after-allocation.
1-4244-0429-O/06/$20.OO ©2006 IEEE Linear programming problems [10] , [25] have proved valu-but not the exact values. able for modeling many types of problems in planning, routThe rest of paper is organized as follows. We begin with ing, scheduling, optimization, and assignment. In the linear a brief introduction of previous work in Section II, then programming problems, there are n decision variables, m review the simplex method in Section III. We review a few linear constraints, and a linear objective function. The goal cryptographic tools that we use in the solution in Section IV, is then to find a solution that minimizes the objective function and present some building blocks in Section V. In Section VI, while satisfying the m constraints.
we describe our protocol for solving collaborative linear Although linear programming problems have been well programming problems. We present a practical solution that studied in the literature ([10] , [25] , [18] , [1] , to list a few), prevents certain dishonest behaviors in Section VII. Finally, we these solutions do not readily extend to the framework con-conclude the paper and discuss the future work in Section VIII. sidered here. For example, Alice has a private constraints on II. RELATED WORK n decision variables, and Bob has Q private constraints on the One of the fundamental techniques for solving linear prosame decision variables. Alice and Bob want to jointly find gramming problems is the simplex method developed by a non-negative solution that minimizes some linear objective Dantzig [10] . The simplex method is an efficient procedure function and also satisfies the combined a + Q linear con-for solving large practical linear programs on the computer. straints. Without loss of generality, we assume A, b, and c are But the simplex method is not a polynomial-time algorithm: additively shared between Alice and Bob. That is, A = A'+A" Klee and Minty [19] created a worst-case example in which where A' is known only to Alice and A" is known only to Bob. the simplex algorithm would require an exponential number of Vectors b and c are shared by Alice and Bob in an analogous pivots, however, such cases seem never to be countered in real way. It is easy to see that the previous example is a special case world problems. Karmarkar [ 18] developed a polynomial-time of this general sharing. We now define the secure collaborative algorithm for solving linear programmes. Although polynolinear programming problem as follows.
mial, the cost of his algorithm is much higher than the cost of Problem 1: Alice has a matrix A' and two vectors b' and the simplex method when solving practical problems. In this c', and Bob has a matrix A" and two vectors b" and c", where paper, we focus on the simplex method, and propose a secure A', A" are m x n matrices, b', b" are m-dimensional vectors, linear programming protocol based on it. and c', c" are n-dimensional vectors. Let A = A' + A", b
Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) [26] , [17] , [16] is a b' + b", and c = c' + c". Without In this section, we briefly review two cryptographic tools is an n-dimensional vector, x is an n-dimensional vector, and that shall be used in our protocol. the superscript T stands for transpose. has private input x and the generator has private input y, and Algorithm 1 (Simplex Algorithm): Assume that a linear they jointly compute f'v, y) without revealing their private inprogram in standard form (1) has been converted to a fea-put to the other party. Recently, the scrambled circuit protocol sible canonical form (2). Throughout the algorithm, we use has been implemented in [20] .
(Xi i J2 xj) to denote the ordered set of the basic The scrambled circuit protocol is secure against honest-butvariables. The algorithm steps are as follows: curious adversaries. When the size of the circuit that computes 1) Find incoming variable. Let s, 1 Ks Kin, be the index f is linear to xz, the size of the input, the complexity of the where cs is a minimum in c, that is c m= mic. If scrambled circuit protocol is O( xl) modular exponentiations.
Cs . 0, then report the basic feasible solution as optimal In this paper, we use the scramble circuit protocol to compute and stop. If c5 <0O, then s is the index of the incoming some simple functions, such as, finding the minimum value basic variable. from an array that is shared between Alice and Bob.
V. NOTATION AND BUILDING BLOCKS
where A, b, c, and zo are specified in the canonical form (2) This section aims at making the later presentation of the of a linear program. The simplex algorithm is essentially a protocol much crisper by presenting some of the ideas and sequence of pivot steps on the matrix D. In the rest of this building blocks for it ahead of time. In the rest of this paper paper, we refer the linear system corresponding to D to the we assume, without loss of generality, that all inputs are following linear program integers; the reason this is not a limitation is the linearity cT = _ z of the optimization problem we are solving, which allows us
A.x = b
to "scale up" to integer values the inputs to our protocol and laero scl th anwr bac dw.
Our secure linear programming protocol computes the same later on scale the answers back down. matrix D as the simplex method. A crucial difference is that A. Our Security Model the matrix is additively split by Alice and Bob: Alice and Bob At this point, we consider only honest-but-curious adver-each hold matrix D' and D", respectively, the sum of which saries who follow the prescribed protocol and attempt to is the matrix D; i.e., D = D' + D". The protocol will keep learn more information than allowed from the execution. this as an invariant through all its steps. Adversaries that try to influence the result of the protocol shall D. Pivoting the Matrix be considered in Section VII.
We now describe how Alice and Bob perform pivoting on Our security model follows directly from [16] . Let x be the additively split matrix D. It is shown in [2] that the Alice's private input and y be Bob's private input. Let f be split division protocols are much expensive than the split a function f: {O, 1} X {O, 1} * > {O, 1}* such that f (x, Y) multiplication protocol. We need to avoid divisions in the is the result of the collaborative linear programming. Suppose matrix pivot if possible. Thus we modify the matrix pivot as there is a two-party protocol II in which Alice inputs x and follows.
Bob inputs y, in the end, both Alice and Bob learn f (x, y). is a trust third party who receives x from Alice and y from
The resulting system of the modified matrix pivot is equivBob, computes f (x, y), and returns f (x, y) to both party. A alent to the original system, as the pivot does not alter the protocol II is secure if any adversary interacting in the real solution set. However, the resulting system may no longer be protocol II can do no more harm than in the ideal scenario. in the canonical form. Observe that for the basic variables xi j2
...xj,-oftessm, x hsanon-zero (instead of B. Additively Split Data jl . a * of the system, has In the rest of this paper, we use following notations: any a unit) coefficient in ith equation and a zero coefficient in all items superscripted with' are known to Alice but not to Bob other equations. We call such system to be in a semi-canonical those superscripted with" are known to Bob but not to Alice. form Suppose we have a semi-canonical system with the In what follows, we often additively split an item x between basic variables -z, 'jii Xj2'* xsij,m then the solution for this Alice and Bob for the purpose of hiding it from either party. An semi-canonical form is z =zo, 'i = bi/a-1l,... item x is said to be additively split between Alice and Bob if bm/ajm.-We next give the matrix pivoting protocol that Alice has x' and Bob has xl" such that x = xl + xl" (mod N), performs the modified matrix pivot. but the value of x is known to either party. The modulus As mentioned earlier, in order to prevent leaking informaOur solution to avoid leaking the pivot position is as follows: tion about the pivot position, Alice and Bob blind-and-permute Suppose Alice and Bob additively share the matrix D, Alice the matrix D before each pivot step. Unfortunately, one side and Bob jointly permute D in a way that the permutation affect of the matrix permutation is that the indexes of the basic is known to neither of them, and in the end the permuted variables are also permuted. After a series of permutations, matrix D is additively split between them using different when we figure out the basic variables of the resulting matrix, randomness. Now it no longer matters if Alice and Bob know we need to find out the corresponding variables in the initial where to pivot in D because they have no way of relating matrix. In other words, we want to compute the corresponding the pivot position in D to the corresponding position in the column index of the original matrix given a column index original matrix D, and therefore using matrix pivoting protocol of the final matrix D after a series of permutations. This is becomes acceptable. We next describe a protocol that achieves described next. this "blinded permutation". ble circuit protocol to find whether the vector The cost of step 5 is about O(mn) modular exponentiations. Kdii, d12, ... ., d1n) (which corresponds to c) is positive Let k be number of steps repeated. In step 6, the total cost 2Note that the techniques from [14] is used to reduce the computation ofOk)(hcstfteinxsrcvrngptcl)lu from number of bits requires to represent the modulus N to the number of°(£mm) (the cost of evaluating g for n times). The total cost bits required to represent an unsplit value, ofthis protocol is about 0 (kmn+ k£ + k£m + £m) modular exponentiations. Because n > m, the total cost becomes solutions to SFE to make our protocol secure against malicious O(k(mn + £n) + £mn).
adversaries; such solutions, however, are expensive. A. Security Proof A. Building Blocks
In proving the security of our protocol, we use the compoAs our solution needs to use cryptographic commitment sition theorem of [5] extensively. This theorem states that if a schemes and zero-knowledge proof techniques, we here briefly function f is computed by invoking functions f., . , fn and review the Pedersen commitment scheme [23] .
is proven secure if these functions are "perfectly" implemented Definition 3 (The Pedersen Commitment Scheme): Let p in a secure manner (i.e., by using a trusted third party), then and q be two large primes such that q divides p -1. Let g a protocol that computes f by invoking secure protocols for be a generator of Gq, the unique order-q subgroup of Z* .... ,: fn, each of which is proven secure, securely computes Let h be a random value in Gq such that logg h is unknown f. A consequence of this theorem is that to prove a protocol to anyone. To commit a value a C Zq, the prover chooses that sequentially invokes functions f., . , fn is secure in r < Z/q and computes the commitment c = (gahr mod p). We now review a zero-knowledge proof protocol that will be all of our protocols produce additively-split outputs, the first used in our solution. Given n commitments, this protocol [6] constraint is trivially true for all of our protocols. We 3) The prover proves to the verifier the knowledge of protocol (step 2, 3, 4, and 6). The optimization. Natural extensions include:
